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1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED ST4TES
No. 83-1330

UNITED STATES, PETITIONER v.
THOMAS J. HENSLEY
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
[November-, 1984]

JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case,-- U. S. - - (1984),
to determine whether police officers may stop and briefly detain a person who is the subject of a "wanted flyer" while
they attempt to find out whether an arrest warrant has been
issued. We conclude that such stops are consistent with the
Fourth Amendment under appropriate circumstances.
I
On December 4, 1981, two armed men robbed a tavern in
the Cincinnati suburb of St. Bernard, Ohio. Six days later, a
St. Bernard police officer, Kenneth Davis, interviewed an informant who passed along information that respondent
Thomas Hensley had driven the getaway car during the
armed robbery. Officer Davis obtained a written statement
from the informant and immediately issued a "wanted flyer"
to other police departments in the Cincinnati metropolitan
area.
The flyer twice stated that Hensley was wanted for investigation of an aggravated robbery. It described both
Hensley and the date and location of the alleged robbery, and
asked other departments to pick up and hold Hensley for the
St. Bernard police in the event he were located. The flyer
also warned other departments to use caution and to consider
Hensley armed and dangerous.
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The St. Bernard Police Department's "wanted flyer" was
received by teletype in the headquarters of the Covington
Police Department on December 10, 1981. Covington is a
Kentucky suburb of Cincinnati that is approximately five
miles from St. Bernard. The flyer was read aloud at each
change of shift in the Covington Police Department between
December 10 and December 16, 1981. Some of the Covington officers were acquainted with Hensley, and after December 10 they periodically looked for him at places in Covington
he was known to frequent.
On December 16, 1981, Covington Officer Terrence Eger
saw a white Cadillac convertible stopped in the middle of a
Covington street. Officer Eger saw Hensley in the driver's
seat and asked him to move on. As Hensley drove away,
Eger inquired by radio whether there was a warrant outstanding for Hensley's arrest. Before the dispatcher could
answer, two other Covington officers who were in separate
cars on patrol interrupted to say that there might be an Ohio
robbery warrant outstanding on Hensley. The officers,
Daniel Cope and David Raasche, subsequently testified that
they had heard or read the St. Bernard flyer on several occasions, that they recalled that the flyer sought a stop for investigation only, and that in their experience the issuance of
such a flyer was usually followed by the issuance of arrest
warrant. While the dispatcher checked to see whether a
warrant had been issued, Officer Cope drove to a Holman
Street address where Hensley occasionally stayed, and Officer Raasche went to check a second location.
The dispatcher had difficulty in confirming whether a warrant had been issued. Unable to locate the flyer, she called
the Cincinnati Police Department on the mistaken belief that
the flyer had originated in Cincinnati. The Cincinnati Police
Department transferred the call to its records department,
which placed the dispatcher on hold. In the meantime, Officer Cope reported that he had sighted a white Cadillac approaching him on Holman Street. Cope turned on his flash-
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ing lights and Hensley pulled over to the curb. Before Cope
left his patrol car, the dispatcher advised him that she had
"Cincinnati hunting for the warrant," App. 49, but that she
had not yet confirmed it. Cope approached Hensley's car
with his service revolver drawn and pointed into the air. He
had Hensley and a passenger seated next to him step out of
the car.
Moments later, Officer Raasche arrived in his separate car.
He recognized the passenger, Albert Green, a convicted
felon. Raasche stepped up to the open passenger door of
Hensley's car and observed the butt of a revolver protruding
from the underneath the passenger's seat. Green was then
arrested. A search of the car uncovered a second handgun
wrapped in a jacket in the middle of the front seat and a third
handgun in a bag in the back seat. After the discovery of
these weapons, Hensley was also arrested.
After state handgun possession charges against Hensley
were dismissed, Hensley was indicted by a federal grand jury
in the Eastern District of Kentucky for being a convicted
felon in possession of firearms in violation of 18 U. S. C. App.
§ 1202(a)(1). Hensley moved to suppress the handguns from
evidence on the grounds that Covington police had impermissibly stopped him in violation of the Fourth Amendment and
the principles announced in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968).
The District Judge held the stop to be proper and denied the
motion. Res~ondent was convicted after a bench trial and
sentenced to two years in federal prison.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed the conviction. 713 F. 2d 220 (1983). The panel
noted that the Covington police could not justifiably conclude
from the St. Bernard flyer that a warrant had been issued for
Hensley's arrest; nor could the Covington police stop the respondent while they attempted to find out whether a warrant
had in fact been issued. Reviewing this Court's decisions
applying Terry, the Sixth Circuit concluded that investigative stops remain a narrow exception to the probable cause
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requirement, and that this Court has manifested a "clear intention to restrict investigative stops to settings involving
the investigation of ongoing crimes." I d., at 225. Since
Covington police encountered Hensley almost two weeks
after the armed robbery in St. Bernard, they had no reason
to believe they were investigating an ongoing crime. Because the Covington police were familiar only with the St.
Bernard flyer, and not with the specific information which led
the St. Bernard police to issue the flyer, the Court of Appeals
held they lacked a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an
investigative stop. The Court of Appeals concluded that
Hensley's conviction rested on evidence obtained through an
illegal arrest, and therefore had to be reversed. We disagree, and now reverse.
II
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures. In Terry,
supra, and subsequent cases, this Court has held that, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, police may stop persons
in the absence of probable cause under limited circumstances.
See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 207-211 (1979).
In particular, the Court has noted that law enforcement
agents may briefly stop a moving automobile to investigate a
reasonable suspicion that its occupants are involved in criminal activity. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U. S. 873, 881 (1974) <}Vithin United States borders, government interest in preventing illegal entry of aliens permits
Terry stop on reasonable suspicion that particular vehicle
contains aliens). Although stopping a car and detaining its
occupants constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, the governmental interest in investigating an officer's reasonable suspicion, based on specific and
articulable facts, may outweigh the Fourth Amendment interest of the driver and passengers in remaining secure from

fe
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the intrusion. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648,
653-655 (1979).

In this case, the Sixth Circuit announced two prerequisites
to such an investigatory stop and held that they were lacking:
first, the crime being investigated was not imminent or ongoing, but rather was already completed; second, the "wanted
flyer" was insufficient to create a reasonable suspicion that
respondent had engaged in criminal activity. If either part
of this an~sis is correct, then it was indeed improper to stop
respondent, and his conviction cannot stand. We accordingly turn to the separate but related issues of Terry stops to
investigate completed crimes and Terry stops in reliance on
another police department's "wanted flyer."

A
This is the first case we have addressed in which police
stopped a person because they suspected he was involved in a
completed crime. In our previous decisions involving investigatory stops on less than probable cause, police stopped or
seized a person because they suspected he was about to commit a crime, e. g. Terry, supra, or was committing a crime at
the moment of the stop, e. g. Adams v. Williams, 407 U. S.
143 (1972). Noting that Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491
(1983), struck down a particularly intrusive detention of a
person suspected of committing an ongoing crime, the Court
of Appeals in ~his case concluded that we clearly intended to
restrict investigative stops to the context of ongoing crimes.
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals that our prior
opinions contemplate an inflexible rule that precludes police
from stopping persons they suspect of past criminal activity
unless they have probable cause for arrest. To the extent
previous opinions have addressed the issue at all, they have
suggested that some investigative stops based on a reasonable suspicion of past criminal activity could withstand
Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Thus United States v. Cortez,
449 U. S. 411, 417 n. 2 (1981), indicates in a footnote that

;1

-::: JG:;
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"[o]f course, an officer may stop and question a person if
there are reasonable grounds to believe that person is
wanted for past criminal conduct." And in United States v.
Place, 462 U. S. 696 (1983), decided barely a month before
the Sixth Circuit's opinion, this Court stated that its prior
opinions acknowledged police authority to stop a person
"when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that
the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal
activity." ld., at-- (emphasis added). See also Michigan v. Summers, 452 U. S. 692, 699 n. 7 (1981). Indeed,
Florida v. Royer itself suggests that certain seizures are justifiable under the Fourth Amendment even in the absence of
probable cause "if there is articulable suspicion that a person
has committed or is about to commit a crime." Supra, at 498
(plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
At the least, these dicta sugges~ that the police are not
automatically shorn of authority to stop a suspect in the absence of probable cause merely because the criminal has completed his crime and escaped from the scene. The precise
limits on investigatory stops to investigate past criminal activity are more difficult to define. The proper way to
identify the limits is to apply the same test already used to
identify the proper bounds of intrusions that further
investigations of imminent or ongoing crimes. That test,
which is grounded in the standard of reasonableness embodied in the Fourth Amendment, balances the nature and quality of the intrusion on personal security against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the
intrusion. United States v. Place, supra, at--; Michigan
v. Summers, supra, at 698-701. When this balancing test is
applied to stops to investigate past crimes, we think that
probable cause to arrest need not always be required.
The factors in the balance may be somewhat different
when a stop to investigate past criminal activity is involved
rather than a stop to investigate ongoing criminal conduct.
This is because the governmental interests and the nature of
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the intrusions involved in the two situations may differ. As
we noted in Terry, one general interest present in the context of ongoing or imminent criminal activity is "that of effective crime prevention and detection." Terry, supra, at 22.
A stop to investigate an already completed crime does not
necessarily promote the interest of crime prevention as directly as a stop to investigate suspected ongoing criminal activity. Similarly, the exigent circumstances which require a
police officer to step in before a crime is committed or completed are not necessarily as pressing long afterwards. Public safety may be less threatened by a suspect in a past crime
who now appears to be going about his lawful business than it
is by a suspect who is currently in the process of violating the
law. Finally, officers making a stop to investigate past
crimes may have a wider range of opportunity to choose the
time and circumstances of the stop. See Broum v. Texas,
443 U. S. 47, 51 (1979); Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure 12 (Proposed Official Draft, 1975).
Despite these differences, where police have been unable
to locate a person suspected of involvement in a past crime,
the ability to briefly stop that person, ask questions, or check
identification in the absence of probable cause promotes the
strong government interest in solving crimes and bringing offenders to justice. Restraining police action until after probable cause is obtained would not only hinder the investigation, but might also enable the suspect to flee in the interim
and to remain at large. Particularly in the context of felonies or crimes involving a threat to public safety, it is in the
public interest that the crime be solved and the suspect detained as promptly as possible. The law enforcement interests at stake in these circumstances outweigh the individual's
interest to be free of a stop and detention that is no more extensive than permissible in the investigation of imminent or
ongoing crimes.
We need not and do not decide today whether Terry stops
to investigate all past crimes, however serious, are permit-
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ted, or whether there is a particular length of time after
which a past crime becomes so stale that an investigative
stop must be justified by probable cause. It is enough to say
that, when police have a reasonable suspicion, grounded in
specific and articulable facts, that a person they encounter
was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed
felony, then a Terry stop may be made to investigate that
suspicion. The automatic barrier to such stops erected by
the Court of Appeals accordingly cannot stand.
B

At issue in this case is a stop of a person by officers of one
police department in reliance on a flyer issued by another department indicating that the person is wanted for investigation of a felony. The Court of Appeals concluded that "the
Fourth Amendment does not permit police officers in one department to seize a person simply because a neighboring police department has circulated a flyer reflecting the desire to
question that individual about some criminal investigation
that does not involve the investigating officers or their department." 713 F. 2d, at 225. This holding apparently
rests on the omission from the flyer of the specific and articulable facts which led the first department to suspect respondent's involvement in a completed crime. Ibid.
This Court discussed a related issue in Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U. 8:- 560 (1971). In Whiteley, a county sheriff in
Wyoming obtained an arrest warrant for a person suspected
of burglary. The sheriff then issued a message through a
state-wide law enforcement radio network describing the
suspect, his car, and the property taken. At least one version of the message also indicated that a warrant had been
issued. I d., at 564 and n. 5. The message did not specify
the evidence that gave the sheriff probable cause to believe
the suspect had committed the breaking and entering. In
reliance on the radio message, police in Laramie stopped the
suspect and searched his car. The Supreme Court, in an
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opm10n by Justice Harlan, ultimately concluded that the
sheriff had lacked probable cause to obtain the warrant and
that the evidence obtained during the search by the police in
Laramie had to be excluded. In so ruling, however, the
Court noted:
"We do not, of course, question that the Laramie police were entitled to act on the strength of the radio bulletin. Certainly police officers called upon to aid other
officers in executing arrest warrants are entitled to assume that the officers requesting aid offered the magistrate the information requisite to support an independent judicial assessment of probable cause. Where,
however, the contrary turns out to be true, an otherwise
illegal arrest cannot be insulated from challenge by the
decision of the instigating officer to rely on fellow officers to make the arrest." I d., at 568.
This language in Whiteley suggests that, had the sheriff
who issued the radio bulletin possessed probable cause for arrest, then the Laramie police could have properly arrested
the defendant even though they were unaware of the specific
facts that established probable cause. See United States v.
Maryland, 479 F. 2d 566, 569 (CA5 1973). Thus Whiteley
supports the proposition that, when evidence is uncovered
during a search incident to an arrest in reliance merely on a
flyer or bulletin, its admissibility turns on whether the officers who issued the flyer possessed probable cause to make
the arrest. It does not turn on whether those relying on the
flyer were themselves aware of the specific facts which led
their colleagues to seek their assistance. In an era when
criminal suspects are increasingly mobile and increasingly
likely to flee across jurisdictional boundaries, this rule is a
matter of common sense: it minimizes the volume of information concerning suspects that must be transmitted to other
jurisdictions and enables police in one jurisdiction to act
promptly in reliance on information from another
jurisdiction.
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Neither respondent nor the Court of Appeals suggest any
reason why a police department should be able to act on the
basis of a flyer indicating that another department has a warrant, but should not be able to act on the basis of a flyer indicating that another department has a reasonable suspicion of
involvement with a crime. Faced with this precise issue, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied Whiteley and
concluded that, although the officer who issues a wanted bulletin must have a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a
stop, the officer who acts in reliance on the bulletin is not
required to have personal knowledge of the evidence creating
a reasonable suspicion. United States v. Robinson, 536 F.
2d 1298, 1300 (1976). The Ninth Circuit there noted "that
effective law enforcement cannot be conducted unless police
officers can act on directions and information transmitted by
one officer to another and that officers, who must often act
swiftly, cannot be expected to cross-examine their fellow officers about the foundation for the transmitted information."
/d., at 1299.
It could be argued that police can more justifiably rely on a
report that a magistrate has issued a warrant than on a report that another law enforcement agency has simply concluded that it has a reasonable suspicion sufficient to authorize an investigatory stop. We do not find this distinction
significant. The law enforcement interests promoted by allowing one department to make investigatory stops based
upon another department's bulletins or flyers are considerable, while the intrusion on personal security is minimal.
The same interests that weigh in favor of permitting police to
make a Terry stop to investigate a past crime, supra, at--,
support permitting police in other jurisdictions to rely on flyers or bulletins in making stops to investigate past crimes.
We conclude that, if an objective reading of a flyer or bulletin would lead an experienced law enforcement officer to conclude that a person is wanted for questioning or for arrest in
another jurisdiction, then reliance on that flyer or bulletin
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justifies a stop to check identification, see United States ex
rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F. 2d 397, 400-401 (CA7) (STEVENS, J.), cert. en 421 U. S. 1016 (1975), to pose questions
to the person, or to etain the person briefly while attempting to obtain further information. See Adams v. Williams,
407 U. S. 143, 146 (1972) ("A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the
status quo momentarily while obtaining other information,
may be the most reasonable in the light of the facts known to
the officer at the time"). It is the objective reading of the
flyer or bulletin that determines whether other police officers
are entitled to act in reliance upon it. Cf. Terry, supra, at
21-22 (" ... it is imperative that the facts be judged against
an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer
at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate?"). In addition, we hold that, assuming the police
make a Terry stop in justifiable reliance on a flyer or bulletin,
the evidence uncovered in the course of such a stop is admissible if the police who issued the flyer or bulletin possessed a
reasonable suspicion justifying a stop, United States v.
Robinson, supra, and if the stop that in fact occurred was not
significantly more intrusive than would have been permitted
the issuing department.
III
It remains to apply the two sets of principles described
above to the stop and subsequent arrest of respondent
Hensley.
At the outset, we assume arguendo that the St. Bernard
police who issued the "wanted flyer" on Hensley lacked probable cause for his arrest. The District Court implied that
the St. Bernard police had probable cause for arrest, but held
only that the St. Bernard officers had reasonable suspicion
sufficient to justify a stop. Crim No. 82-29 (ED Ky., October 19, 1982). The Court of Appeals implied that probable
cause might be lacking, 713 F. 2d, at 223, but ultimately con-

r om {:;e.cf
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eluded that the question was irrelevant because the Covington police would not be entitled to make an arrest or a stop
regardless of whether the St. Bernard police possessed probable cause or a reasonable suspicion. In this Court, no party
contends that the St. Bernard police had probable cause to
arrest Hensley.
We agree with the District Court that the St. Bernard police possessed a reasonable suspicion, based on specific and
articulable facts, that Hensley was involved in an armed robbery. The District Judge heard testimony from the St. Bernard officer who interv~ewed the informer. On the strength
of the evidence, the District Court concluded that the wealth
of detail concerning the robbery revealed by the informer,
coupled with her admission of tangential participation in the
robbery, established that the informer was sufficiently reliable and credible "to arouse a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity by [Hensley] and to constitute the specific and articulable facts needed to underly a stop." Crim No. 82-29 (ED
Ky., October 19, 1982). Under the circumstances, "the information carried enough indicia of reliability," Adams v.
Williams, 407 U. S. 143, 147 (1972), to justify an investigatory stop of Hensley.
The justification for a stop did not evaporate when the
armed robbery was completed. Hensley was reasonably
suspected of involvement in a felony and was at large from
the time the suspicion arose until the stop by the Covington
police. A brief stop and detention at the earliest opportunity after the suspicion arose is fully consistent with the principles of the Fourth Amendment.
Turning to the flyer issued by the St. Bernard police, we
believe it satisfies the objective test announced today. An
objective reading of the entire flyer would lead an experienced officer to conclude that Thomas Hensley was at least
wanted for questioning and investigation in St. Bernard.
That alone would justify a brief stop to check Hensley's identification, pose questions, and inform the suspect that the St.
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Bernard police wished to question him. As an experienced
officer could well assume that a warrant might have been obtained in the period after the flyer was issued, we think the
flyer would further justify a brief detention at the scene of
the stop while officers checked whether a warrant had in fact
been issued. It is irrelevant whether the Covington officers
intended to detain Hensley only long enough to confirm the
existence of a warrant, or for some longer period; what matters is that the stop and detention that occurred were in fact
no more intrusive than would have been permitted an experienced officer on an objective reading of the flyer.
To be sure, the St. Bernard flyer at issue did not request
that other police departments briefly detain Hensley merely
to check his identification or confirm the existence of a warrant. Instead, it asked other departments to pick up and
hold Hensley for St. Bernard. Our decision today does not
suggest that such a detention, whether at the scene or at the
Covington police headquarters, would have been justified.
Given the distance involved and the time required to identify
and communicate with the department that issued the flyer,
such a detention might well be so lengthy or intrusive as to
exceed the permissible limits of a Terry stop. See United
States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696,-- (1983). Nor do we mean
to endorse St. Bernard's request in its flyer for actions that
could forseeably violate the Fourth Amendment. We hold
only that this flyer, objectively read, justified the length and
intrusiveness of the stop and detention that actually
occurred.
When the Covington officers stopped Hensley, they were
authorized to take such steps as were reasonably necessary
to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status
quo during the course of the stop. The Covington officers'
conduct was well within the permissible range in the context
of suspects who are reported to be armed and dangerous.
See Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. - - , - - - - (1983);
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U. S. 106, 110-111 (1977) (per
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curiam). Having stopped Hensley, the Covington police
were entitled to seize evidence revealed in plain view in the
course of the lawful stop, to arrest Hensley's passenger when
evidence discovered in plain view gave probable cause to believe the passenger had committed a crime, Texas v. Brown,
460 U. S. 730 (1983) (plurality opinion), and subsequently to
search the passenger compartment of the car because it was
within the passenger's immediate control. New York v.
Belton, 453 U. S. 454 (1981). Finally, having discovered additional weapons in Hensley's car during the course of a lawful search, the Covington officers had probable cause to arrest Hensley himself for possession of firearms.
The length of Hensley's detention from his stop to his arrest on probable cause was brief. A reasonable suspicion on
the part of the St. Bernard police underlies and supports
their issuance of the flyer. Finally, the stop that occurred
was reasonable in objective reliance on the flyer and was not
significantly more intrusive than would have been permitted
the St. Bernard police. Under these circumstances, the investigatory stop was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and the evidence discovered during the stop was
admissible.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
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.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

November 29, 1984

Re:

83-1330 - United States v. Hensley

Dear Sandra:
Although I have had a good deal of difficulty with
this case, when I read your draft opinion I found that
I was persuaded until I came to the bottom of page 10.
You conclude that the justification for a Terry stop
based on another police department's flyer or bulletin
depends on what the flyer or bulletin says, rather than
the information in the originating police department
that gave rise to the flyer. It would seem to me that
the validity of the stop, like the validity of the
arrest in Whiteley, should depend on the information
that was available to the entire police establishment.
I would therefore propose that the concluding paragraph
on page 10 be revised to read something like this:
•we conclude that, if a flyer or bulletin has
been issued on the basis of articulable facts
supporting a reasonable suspicion that the wanted
person has committed an offense, then reliance on
that flyer or bulletin justifies a stop to check
identification."
Subsequent portions of the op1n1on would, of
course, have to be changed to conform to this reading.
It seems to me most unwise for the Court to
endorse stops that are based on totally unsupported
flyers or bulletins simply because they appear to be
facially valid. I would agree, of course, that an
officer making such a stop would have a good faith
defense to any suit based on the incorrect stop, but I
simply cannot understand why we should conclude that
such a stop is legitimate. Indeed, the Government's

brief seemed to endorse •the proposition that an
officer who receives a police bulletin has 'the same
right' to make a stop or an arrest as the officer who
issued the bulletin.• Brief, at 19.
In all events, if you could see your way clear to
recasting this part of the opinion, I would be prepared
to join you.
Respectfully,

J~
Justice O'Connor
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

November 30, 1984
Re:

No. 83-1330

United States v. Hensley

Dear Sandra,
Please join me.
Sincerely,

l,r/

Justice O'Connor
cc:

The Conference

December 6, 1984

83-1330 United States v. Hensley

Dear Sandra:
Please ioi.n me.
Sincer~ly,

Justice O'Connor
lfp/ss
cc:

·~· ~. :

The Conference
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2llgt~~

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

December 8, 1984

No. 83-1330

United States v. Hensley

Dear John,
Since our correspondence has been circulated to
the Conference I have heard no objection from others to
accommodating your suggestion. I have made the suggested
changes in the new draft circulated herewith as noted on
pages 10, 11, and 13.
Sincerely,

Justice Stevens

Copies to the Conference
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CHAMI!IERS 01'

.JUSTICE

w ... .J .

BRENNAN, .JR .

December 10, 1984

Re:

United States v. Hensley, No. 83-1330

· Dear Sandra:
I had originally intended to dissent in this case,
but your persuasive opinion has largely convinced me
otherwise. However, I am troubled by two relatively
minor points on page 11 of the draft. First, I wonder
about the advisability of including the two sentences on
page 11 beginning with "If the flyer has been issued in
the absence ••• " Neither the parties nor the lower court
in this case addressed the issue of civil damage actions
arising from stops like that conducted here. If any
modification of ordinary immunity law is required to take
account of our decision in this case (and I do not take
your opinion to be intending such a modification), should
we not address that issue in a case where it is squarely
presented? Second, in the last sentence of the same
paragraph the draft speaks of stops as legitimate if "not
significantly more intrusive than would have been
permitted the issuing department." I am uncomfortable
with the idea that the second police department has any
greater authority in these circumstances than the first
police department and would therefore prefer that the
word "significantly" be removed from this sentence.
If you could make these modifications, I would be
pleased to join and would file only the enclosed
concurrence.

s/E1,

W.J.B.,Jr.
Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference

"nvrtnu C!fcurt .ttf l4t :Jlnift~ .Jtatt•
~a.-Jrington. ~ . Of. 2ll~_,.~
CHAMB E R S OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

December 11, 1984
No. 83-1330

United States

v. Hensley

Dear Bill,
Thanks for your letter and suggestions. Naturally, I
would be delighted to have your concurrence in the
circulating opinion. The new language on page 11 was the
result of my correspondence with John and I am reluctant to
make additional major changes.
I included the word "significantly" in the last
sentence of Part II because it appeared likely that, when a
police officer makes an investigatory stop based on a flyer
or bulletin from another police department, the duration of
the stop might be somewhat longer than if the stop were made
by the department issuing the flyer. This is because the
department receiving the flyer may require sufficient time
to contact the issuing department to obtain any requested
information. I would prefer to leave the language intact,
although if it would meet your concerns I would be willing
to delete the word "significantly" and substitute something
along the following lines:
"Of course, a stop made by officers in reliance on a
wanted flyer might need to last somewhat longer than a stop
made by the officers who issued the flyer. This is because
the officers who rely on a flyer may need to communicate
with the issuing department, and efforts to identify and
contact the issuing department may require more time than it
takes an officer in the issuing department to call his own
headquarters."
With respect to the language about civil liability of
the officers making the stop, I think it is important to
indicate in some way that officers acting in reasonable
reliance on a flyer or bulletin from another department are
not civilly liable for doing so. As the Solicitor General's
brief in this case notes, police departments in the
Cincinnati area have begun to refuse to act on flyers from
other departments. Brief at 10, n. 8. Ambiguity about
civil liability could cause this trend to continue, despite
the other language in the opinion. It is well established
that officers who act in good faith reliance on a warrant
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have a defense to civil suits should the warrant turn out to
be invalid. See, e.g., Turner v. Raynes, 611 F.2d 92, 93
(CAS), cert. denied, 449 u.s. 900 (1980). The opinion
already analogizes to Whiteley, where police acted on a
report that a warrant had been issued, to conclude that
police can act on a flyer requesting an investigatory stop
just as they can act on a flyer requesting execution of an
arrest warrant. I do not think it is a modification of
existing immunity law, or a particularly great leap of
reasoning, to say that officers who act in good faith
reliance on a flyer enjoy protection similar to that
possessed by officers who act in good faith reliance on a
warrant. I would prefer to expressly so indicate. Would it
alleviate your concerns if the sentences were amended to
read:
"If the flyer has been issued in the absence of a
reasonable suspicion, then a stop in objective reliance upon
it violates the Fourth Amendment. In such a situation, of
course, the officers making the stop may have a good faith
defense to any civil suit. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 u.s.
232 (1974); Pierson v. Ray, 386 u.s. S47 (1967); Turner v.
Raynes, 611 F.2d 92, 93 (CAS), cert. denied, 449 u.s. 900
(1980) (officer relying in good faith on an invalid arrest
warrant has defense to civil suit). It is the objective
reading of the flyer or bulletin that determines whether
other police officers can defensibly act in reliance on it.
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Sincerely,

Justice Brennan

Copies to the Conference
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.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

December 12, 1984

Re:

83-1330 - United States v. Hensley

Dear Sandra:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
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December 13, 1984

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 83-1330, United States v. Hensley

Dear Sandra:
Please join me.

Sin~

Justice O'Connor
cc: The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

December 18 , 1984

Re :

No . 83-1330-u.s . v . Hensley

Dear Sandra:
Please join rre .
Sincerely ,

(/?u .
T.M.

Justice O'Connor
cc :

,.

The Conference
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December 21 t 1984

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

Re:

No. 83-1330 - United States v. Thomas J. Hensley

Dear Sandra,
I join.
Regards,

Justice O'Connor
Copies to the Conference
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